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Rethinking Economics for a New
Era of Financial Regulation:
The Political Economy of
Hyman Minsky
Charles J. Whalen*
INTRODUCTION
Many policymakers and most of the economics profession
failed to anticipate the recent global financial crisis and the
subsequent Great Recession—the most severe downturn since
the Great Depression. Even worse, many economists did not
think such a crisis was possible. “[T]hey positively denied that it
would happen,” says finance professor Franklin Allen of the
Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania.1
In the wake of that crisis, policymakers and economists have
begun to take a fresh look at the financial system. Policymakers,
for example, enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank), signaling a new
era of U.S. financial regulation.2 That legislation seeks to
strengthen and extend financial-system rules and oversight, not
only to protect investors and consumers from deceptive and
abusive practices, but also to reduce systemic risks that could
threaten the economy.3 Meanwhile, economists and financial
analysts have rediscovered the ideas of the late Hyman P.
Minsky (1919–1996), a monetary economist who devoted his
* Principal Analyst, Macroeconomic Analysis Division, U.S. Congressional Budget
Office (CBO). The views expressed in this Article are those of the author and should not
be interpreted as those of the CBO. The initial draft of this Article was prepared shortly
after passage of the Dodd-Frank Act—before the author began working at CBO—and the
final version was submitted for publication in January 2011. This Article draws from and
expands upon the author’s previously published chapter entitled: A Minsky Perspective on
the Global Recession of 2009, in MINSKY, CRISIS AND DEVELOPMENT 106 (Daniela Tavasci
& Jan Toporowski eds., 2010).
1 Why Economists Failed to Predict the Financial Crisis, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON
(May 13, 2009), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2234.
2 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
3 Id.
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career to the study of financial instability.4 In fact, Nobel
Laureate Paul Krugman presented a mid-2009 lecture at the
London School of Economics entitled “The Night They Re-Read
Minsky.”5
This Article takes the ongoing rediscovery of Minsky as its
point of departure and presents his ideas in the context of the
recent crisis. It explains that Minsky’s views provide a way of
rethinking economics that fits with the new era of financial
regulation. Minsky focused on three features of economic life: the
cyclical nature of advanced capitalist economies, the reality of
incessant institutional innovation, and the role of public policy in
fostering and sustaining economic prosperity.6 Each feature
draws inspiration from the scholarship of earlier economists,7
and each remains relevant to understanding today’s economy and
the economic challenges likely to confront policymakers,
economists, and the general public in the years to come.
I. THE CYCLICAL NATURE OF ADVANCED CAPITALIST ECONOMIES
Like many of the economists who earned a Ph.D. at Harvard
in the early 1950s, Minsky drew inspiration from the economics
of John Maynard Keynes.8 Unlike most of his classmates,
however, Minsky was interested in the conception of economic
life underlying Keynes’s analysis, not merely in Keynes’s policy
recommendations for coping with severe business downturns. As
Minsky explains in his 1975 book, John Maynard Keynes, the
economics of Keynes derives from a business cycle perspective of
the economy: the subject matter is “a sophisticated capitalist
economy, whose past and whose future entail business cycles.”9

4 Minsky taught at the University of California at Berkeley and Washington
University before taking up residence at the Levy Economics Institute at Bard College in
the last decade of his life. For evidence of the recent rediscovery of Minsky, see, e.g.
Justin Lahart, In Time of Tumult, Obscure Economist Gains Currency, WALL ST. J., Aug.
18, 2007, at A1; Janet L. Yellen, President and CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F.,
President’s Speech to the 18th Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference on the State of the
U.S. and World Economies: A Minsky Meltdown, Lessons for Central Bankers
(Apr. 16, 2009).
5 Paul Krugman, The Return of Depression Economics III: The Night They Re-Read
Minsky, L.S.E. CENTRE FOR ECON. PERFORMANCE (June 10, 2009), http://cep.lse.ac.uk/
_new/interviews/default.asp.
6 See HYMAN P. MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY 10 (1986).
7 See id. at 8–10 & nn.7–9.
8 Hyman P. Minsky, in A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF DISSENTING ECONOMISTS
352, 353–55 (Philip Arestis & Malcolm Sawyer eds., 1992) [hereinafter Minsky, in A
BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF DISSENTING ECONOMISTS].
9 HYMAN P. MINSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES 58 (1975) [hereinafter MINSKY, JOHN
MAYNARD KEYNES].
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The political economy of Minsky builds on Keynes’ business
cycle perspective.10 Indeed, Minsky’s analyses are rooted in the
notion that economic expansions and contractions are an
inherent part of advanced capitalist economies.11 In John
Maynard Keynes, Minsky defines such economies as
characterized by expensive and long-lived capital goods as well as
by short-term financing and financial markets (the New York
Stock Exchange, for example).12 These are the economies for
which Minsky develops what he calls the “financial instability
hypothesis” (FIH).13
The FIH can be seen as an alternative to the “efficient
market hypothesis” that was popular in academic circles before
the recent financial crisis.14 According to the efficient market
perspective, investors, lenders, and other financial-market
participants are not, as a group, predisposed to overconfidence or
other biases.15
In contrast, the FIH treats panics and
overconfidence—what some have called “irrational exuberance”—
as regular features of the economic landscape.16
Behind both the conventional economics of Keynes’ time and
the modern efficient market hypothesis is an assumption that the
future can be treated as a matter involving risk in the
probabilistic sense.17 In other words, the assumption suggests
that outcomes can be anticipated (and therefore managed) by a
calculation of probabilities. Keynes, however, dismissed that
notion. He argued instead that the economic future most often
involves uncertainty, for which no assignment of probabilities is
possible.18 For example, Keynes wrote:
The whole object of the accumulation of Wealth is to produce results,
or potential results, at a comparatively distant, and sometimes at an
indefinitely distant, date. Thus the fact that our knowledge of the
future is fluctuating, vague and uncertain, renders Wealth a
peculiarly unsuitable subject for the methods of classical economic
theory. This theory might work very well in a world in which

Id. at 56–57.
Id. at 57.
Id.
See Minsky, in A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF DISSENTING ECONOMISTS, supra
note 8, at 355.
14 CHARLES J. WHALEN, LEVY ECON. INST. OF BARD COLLEGE, THE U.S. CREDIT
CRUNCH OF 2007: A MINSKY MOMENT 12 (2009) [hereinafter WHALEN, THE U.S. CREDIT
CRUNCH OF 2007].
15 HERSH SHEFRIN, BEYOND GREED AND FEAR 5 (2002).
16 ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 2 (2d ed. 2005).
17 Paul Davidson, Risk and Uncertainty in Economics 3–7 (Feb. 6, 2009) (paper
presented at the conference on “The Economic Recession and the State of Economics”).
18 John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, 51 Q. J. ECON. 209,
213–14 (1937).
10
11
12
13
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economic goods were necessarily consumed within a short interval of
their being produced.
But it requires, I suggest, considerable
amendment if it is to be applied to a world in which the accumulation
of wealth for an indefinitely postponed future is an important factor;
and the greater the proportionate part played by such wealthaccumulation the more essential does such amendment become.19

In short, wealth accumulation in an advanced capitalist economy
involves uncertainty rather than risk.
In a world of uncertainty, Keynes argued that the
expectations of borrowers and lenders rest on conventions and
rules of thumb that are used to assess the hazards accompanying
economic decisions.20 Minsky followed Keynes’ lead. Minsky
stressed not only that reliance on conventions causes market
participants to engage in herd behavior, but also that such
reliance is a “flimsy foundation” for economic decisions.21 Thus,
the FIH sees an economy in which expectations are prone to
sudden and substantial change.22
According to Minsky’s FIH, the financial structure of our
economy becomes more and more fragile over a period of
prosperity.23 In the early stages of an economic expansion,
enterprises in “highly profitable segments of the economy are
rewarded for taking on increasing amounts of debt. . . . [T]heir
success encourages other firms to engage in similar behavior.”24
Eventually, a number of enterprises—sometimes even many
households—begin to pile up so much debt that they require
refinancing merely to make interest payments.25
That pattern of refinancing was certainly evident in the
high-tech sector during the late-1990s and in the housing sector
during the early- and mid-2000s.26
Indeed, construction
companies and contractors were not the only ones taking on more
Id. at 213.
Id. at 213–14.
Id. at 214–15. See also MINSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, supra note 9, at 91.
Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, supra note 18, at 214–15.
Charles J. Whalen, A Minsky Perspective on the Global Recession of 2009 3
(Research on Money & Fin., Discussion Paper No. 12, 2009), available at
http://www.researchonmoneyandfinance.org/media/papers/RMF-12-Whalen.pdf
[hereinafter Whalen, Global Recession].
24 Id.
25 Minsky calls this extraordinary state of affairs “Ponzi finance” because such a
situation often recalls the pyramid schemes of infamous financial swindler, Charles Ponzi.
Hyman P. Minsky, The Financial Instability Hypothesis 6 (Levy Econ. Inst., Working
Paper No. 74, 1992), available at http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp74.pdf; Ponzi
Schemes—Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/ponzi.htm
(last visited Feb. 26, 2011).
26 Whalen, Global Recession, supra note 23, at 3. See also Kai Tian, What’s the Risk
with Interest Only Mortgage?, EZINE ARTICLES, http://ezinearticles.com/?Whats-the-RiskWith-Interest-Only-Mortgage?&id=3817044 (last visited Feb. 26, 2011).
19
20
21
22
23
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debt at the start of the new millennium.27 Homebuyers also
accumulated a growing amount of debt “as the housing market
began heating up, in part because interest rates were low and the
stock market had become less attractive in the wake of the dotcom boom and bust.”28 While it had long been customary for U.S.
homebuyers to make a twenty percent down payment on a home,
in the last decade, forty-two percent of first-time homebuyers and
thirteen percent of non-first-time homebuyers put no money
down to acquire homes.29
In retrospect, of course, enterprises and homebuyers should
have resisted the impulse toward increasing indebtedness, but
the incentives at the time were just too great. As economists
Gary Dymski and Robert Pollin explained in a 1992 essay,
nobody in a robust sector of the economy wants to be left behind
due to underinvestment:
Even if market participants did have full knowledge of the Minsky
model, and were therefore aware that financial crises will occur at
some point, that still would not enable them to predict when the
financial crisis will occur. In the meantime, aggressive firm managers
and bank loan officers will be rewarded for pursuing profitable
opportunities and gaining competitive advantages.
Cautious
managers, operating from the understanding that boom conditions
will end at some uncertain point, will be penalized when their more
aggressive competitors surpass their short-‐run performance.30

As the preceding quote indicates, lenders, as well as
borrowers, fuel the tendency toward greater indebtedness during
an expansion. The same climate of expectations that encourages
borrowers to acquire more risky financial liability structures also
eases lenders’ worries that new loans might go unpaid.31
Moreover, it is not just that borrowing and lending expand in the
boom. There is also financial innovation (which will be given
further attention in the next section). In fact, in a 1992 essay,
Minsky wrote that bankers and other financial intermediaries
are “merchants of debt who strive to innovate in the assets they
acquire and the liabilities they market.”32

Whalen, Global Recession, supra note 23, at 3.
Id.
Gloria Irwin, No Money Down Gains More Buyers, AKRON BEACON J.
(July 31, 2005), http://www.policymattersohio.org/media/ABJ_No_money_down_gains_
more_buyers_2005_0731.htm.
30 Gary Dymski & Robert Pollin, Hyman Minsky as Hedgehog: The Power of the Wall
Street Paradigm 36 (Univ. of Cal. Riverside, Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 92-24,
1990).
31 Whalen, Global Recession, supra note 23, at 3.
32 Minsky, The Financial Instability Hypothesis, supra note 25, at 6.
27
28
29
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A boom cannot continue forever, however. We eventually
arrive at what some have called the “Minsky moment.”33 In other
words, it eventually becomes clear that some borrowers have
become overextended and need to sell assets (or, if possible,
secure a government bailout) to make their loan payments. In
the recent crisis, early high-profile cases involved the mortgage
broker Countrywide, the British bank Northern Rock, and two
hedge funds run by Bear Stearns (which itself became a casualty
of the crisis some months later).34
Then the problem spreads. Since bankers and investors hold
subjective expectations about acceptable debt levels, once a
shortfall of cash and a forced selling of assets materializes
somewhere in the economy, it can lead to widespread
reassessment of how much debt or lending is appropriate.35
Moreover, the buildup can go on for years, but when anything
goes wrong the revaluation can be sudden.36
When banks decide to rein in their lending, we find ourselves
in a credit crunch. It is easy to think of the recent economic
crisis as something that began with the worldwide stock-market
downturn in the autumn of 2008.37
In fact, though, the
difficulties of 2008 were preceded by a credit crunch that began
in the summer of 2007, and signs of trouble—traceable in large
part to the subprime mortgage market—were evident as early as
March 2007.38
Once a credit crunch emerges, financial difficulties are no
longer confined to one sector.39 In fact, a crunch threatens not
only business investment, but also household spending (which
depends in large part on credit conditions as well as on
employment generated by businesses).40 This means that when a
sectoral bubble bursts—as in the high-tech sector a decade ago or
in the housing sector more recently—the collapse threatens to
trigger an economy-wide recession.41 That sort of slump is what
the United States and much of the world experienced recently.
As the recent crisis demonstrated, a “Minsky moment” can
quickly transform into an economic “meltdown.” In the United
States, that meltdown revealed itself in at least three sectors:

33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

Lahart, supra note 4.
WHALEN, THE U.S. CREDIT CRUNCH OF 2007, supra note 14, at 9, 19–20.
Whalen, Global Recession, supra note 23, at 3.
Id.
Id.
WHALEN, THE U.S. CREDIT CRUNCH OF 2007, supra note 14, at 8.
FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 389 (2011).
Id.
Id. at 390.
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housing, banking, and the stock market.42 House prices, on
average, fell by more than ten percent between the beginning of
the second quarter of 2006 and the end of 2007, when the recent
recession began (as determined by the National Bureau of
Economic Research).43 House prices plummeted by another
twenty-two percent during the recession—wiping out a total of
nearly $6 trillion from the net value of real estate held by
households—and have still not recovered as of this writing
(January 2011).44 In addition, the recent housing downturn has
been accompanied by record levels of “underwater” mortgages
(when a family owes more on their mortgage than their home is
worth) and mortgage defaults.45
The meltdown in banking slowed considerably after
enactment of the federal government’s Troubled Asset Relief
Program (TARP) in 2008, but the damage has still been
substantial in the financial industry.46 Over 300 financial
institutions failed since the beginning of 2007.47 And, “as of the
third quarter of 2010 the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) identified 860 ‘problem’ banks,” the highest number since
the savings and loan crisis nearly two decades ago.48
The stock market has been recovering since mid-2009, but
the initial market decline was stunning, and the loss of
household net worth from falling equity prices was even greater
than the loss from falling house prices.49 The Dow Jones
Industrial Average, for example, fell thirty-seven percent
between March 30, 2007 and April 1, 2009.50 In fact, “[t]he total
value of corporate equities held by households directly or
indirectly (through pensions, life insurance companies,
government retirement programs, or mutual funds) fell by almost
42 U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS
2011 TO 2021 32–34 (2011), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/120xx/doc12039/0126_FY2011Outlook.pdf [hereinafter BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK]; Determination of
the December 2007 Peak in Economic Activity, THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC
RESEARCH 1, http://www.nber.org/cycles/dec2008.pdf (last updated Dec. 11, 2008).
43 BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, supra note 42, at 32.
44 Id. at 33.
45 John Gittelsohn, Home-Price Drop Leaves 27% of U.S. Homeowners Underwater
on Loans, Zillow Says, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 9, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
print/2011-02-09/home-price-decline-leaves-27-of-u-s-owners-underwater-on-loans.html.
46 CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, SEPTEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: ASSESSING THE TARP
ON THE EVE OF ITS EXPIRATION 3 (2010), available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop091610-report.pdf.
47 BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, supra note 42, at 34.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 33.
50 Dow Jones Industrial Average Values from March 30, 2007 to April 1, 2009,
YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com (follow “Dow” hyperlink;; then follow
“Historical Prices” hyperlink;; then search “Mar. 30, 2007” for “Start Date” and search
“Apr. 1, 2009” for “End Date”).
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$8 trillion during the recession.”51 As of the third quarter of
2010, households’ equity holdings had only regained about
$4 trillion—half of what they had lost.52
Looking beyond housing, banking, and equities, one also
finds a troubled U.S. labor market. The nation’s unemployment
rate rose from 4.4% in March 2007 to 10.1% in October 2009
(approaching its post-World War II peak of 10.8%), and in 2010
the jobless rate averaged 9.6%.53 That rate would have been
higher, but many job seekers became discouraged after failing to
find work, leaving the labor force, and were thus excluded from
the official unemployment count.54
Moreover, rates of long-term unemployment observed in
2010 were unprecedented in the post-World War II era. For
example, on average, forty-three percent of workers who were
unemployed in 2010 were out of work for more than twenty-six
weeks.55 Many economic forecasters expect that it will take a few
more years for the unemployment rate to return to less than six
percent.56
According to Minsky’s FIH, a downturn will eventually give
way to recovery.57 An unwinding of the previous credit expansion
is usually a precondition of such a turn of events, but that
process can take years. Moreover, if pessimistic expectations are
allowed to feed on themselves, then a contracting economy can
spiral downward (in what Minsky called a “debt deflation”) for
quite some time.58 If there is a road to full employment by way of
market adjustments alone, Minsky wrote, “it may well go by way
of hell.”59
II. THE REALITY OF INCESSANT INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION
The political economy of Minsky was inspired by Keynes, but
it was also influenced by Minsky’s association with Joseph A.

BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, supra note 42, at 33.
Id.
Monthly Unemployment Rate from 1948 to 2011, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
http://data.bls.gov/pdq/SurveyOutputServlet?data_tool=latest_numbers&series_id=LNS1
4000000 (last visited Mar. 20, 2011) (change output options “from” to 1948); BUDGET AND
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, supra note 42, at 29.
54 News Release, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Employment Situation—
December 2010 (Jan. 7, 2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/
archives.empsit_01072001.pdf.
55 BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, supra note 42, at 31.
56 Id. at 42.
57 MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY, supra note 6, at 175–77.
58 Minsky, The Financial Instability Hypothesis, supra note 25, at 1.
59 MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY, supra note 6, at 177.
51
52
53
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Schumpeter, who supervised Minsky’s doctoral work until his
untimely death in 1950.60
While Keynes offered insight into cyclical fluctuations,
Schumpeter provided Minsky with insight into structural
economic evolution over a series of cycles. That is because
Schumpeter—who coined the phrase “creative destruction”—
placed the dynamic power of ceaseless structural economic
change at the center of his economic analysis.61 In fact, Minsky
underscored an aspect of Schumpeter’s concept of “creative
destruction” that few others recognized: financial innovation.62
“[N]owhere
is
evolution,
change
and
Schumpeterian
entrepreneurship more evident than in banking and finance and
nowhere is the drive for profits more clearly the factor making for
change,” wrote Minsky in an article produced in the last few
years of his life, a period during which his writings gave
increasing attention to Schumpeter’s ideas.63
In the 1990s, Minsky still believed that the U.S. economy
moved along a cyclical path, but he also believed that the system
had recently entered a new stage of capitalist development as a
consequence of constant institutional change.64 According to
Minsky, the managerial era of American capitalism, which
matured in the immediate aftermath of World War II, had given
way in the 1980s to a stage characterized by emergence of money
managers as the nation’s dominant economic decision-makers.65
He called the new era money-manager capitalism (MMC).66
At least four institutional features of MMC have emerged to
play a role in explaining the economic difficulties of the past few
years. The origin of the recent global crisis can be traced in large
part to the following financial-sector innovations: unconventional
mortgages, securitization, the rise of hedge funds, and the
globalization of finance.67
At the heart of the recent financial crisis are home
mortgages that deviate from the traditional U.S. home-loan
60 Minsky, in A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF DISSENTING ECONOMISTS, supra note
8, at 353–54.
61 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 87–89 (4th ed.
1952).
62 Hyman P. Minsky, Schumpeter and Finance, in MARKET AND INSTITUTIONS IN
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 103, 106 (Salvatore Biasco, Alessandro Roncaglia, & Michele
Salvati eds., 1993).
63 Id.
64 Id. at 111–13.
65 Id. at 109–13.
66 Id. at 111–12.
67 For a similar analysis, see generally FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra
note 39.
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arrangement, which involves a long-term loan on fixed-rate
terms.68 Many of these unconventional—some writers call them
“exotic”—mortgages have adjustable interest rates and/or
payments that balloon over time.69 Federal law has allowed
banks to issue adjustable-rate mortgages since 1982, but their
use and complexity exploded starting in 2003.70 For example,
industry experts estimate that a variant called the “option
adjustable rate mortgage” (option ARM), which offers a low
“teaser” rate and later resets so that minimum payments
skyrocket, accounted for about 0.5% of all U.S. mortgages written
in 2003, but close to thirteen percent (and up to fifty-one percent
in some U.S. communities) in 2006.71 More precise figures are
unavailable because banks have not been required to report how
many option ARMs they originate.72
Many of these mortgages were created to target less
creditworthy customers, including those in what the banking
industry calls the subprime market.73 Others were marketed to
people who wanted to speculate in the booming housing market,
through buying and then quickly reselling property.74 However,
many unconventional loans were marketed to ordinary working
families who could have handled conventional mortgages.75
Unfortunately, it was clear from the outset that many of
these exotic mortgages could never be paid back.76 But why did
this happen? Why did the mortgage market evolve in this
dangerous direction?
This is where securitization comes into the picture.
Securitization is simply the bundling of loans—which can include
auto loans, student loans, accounts receivable, and of course,
mortgages—and the subsequent selling of bundle shares to
investors.77 In the mid-1980s, Minsky returned home from a
conference sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

72.

68
69

Id.
Mara Der Hovanesian, Nightmare Mortgages, BUS. WEEK, Sept. 11, 2006, at 71–

Id. at 72.
Id.
Id.
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 39, at 7.
Id.
Bruce Marks, Op-Ed., Bailout Must Address the Foreclosure Crisis, BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept. 24, 2008, at A17.
76 For an eye-opening look at the aggressive marketing of unconventional mortgages,
see Gretchen Morgenson, Inside the Countrywide Lending Spree, N.Y TIMES, Aug. 26,
2007, at BU1, 8.
77 Hyman P. Minsky, The Capital Development of the Economy and the Structure of
Financial Institutions 22 (Levy Economics Institute, Working Paper No. 72, 1992),
available at http://www.levyinstitute.com/pubs/wp72.pdf.
70
71
72
73
74
75
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and wrote that securitization was emerging as a key, new
financial innovation: “That which can be securitized, will be
securitized.”78 He was right, but way ahead of his time.
Securitization of mortgages exploded onto the scene only in the
past decade.
After the dot-com bubble burst in 2001, housing in the
United States looked like a safer and more attractive investment
to many Americans, especially with low interest rates in place
due to Federal Reserve policy.79 Still, returns on conventional
mortgages were too mundane to satisfy the aims of most money
managers. As a result, what Minsky and Schumpeter might
have called the “financial-innovation machine” turned its
attention to housing and shifted into high gear.
Securitization of mortgages meant that home loan
originators could be less concerned about the creditworthiness of
borrowers than in the past.80 Thus, they had an incentive to
steer customers toward the most profitable types of mortgages,
even if they were the riskiest (which, of course, they were). The
result was the explosive growth in option ARMs and in “no
money down” and “no documentation” (of income) loans.81
Minsky warned of all this in 1992, when he observed that
securitization means mortgage originators are rewarded as long
as they avoid “obvious fraud.”82
Securitization worked like magic upon risky mortgages.
Instead of “garbage in, garbage out,” risky loans went into the
process, but out came bundles that received high credit ratings
from agencies like Standard and Poors.83
According to
Christopher Huhne, a member of the British Parliament and
former rating-agency economist, part of the challenge of rating
the bundles was “that financial markets fall in love with new
things, with innovations, and the [important] thing about new
things is that it is very difficult to assess the real riskiness of
them because you don’t have a history by definition.”84

78 Hyman P. Minsky, Schumpeter: Finance and Evolution, in EVOLVING
TECHNOLOGY AND MARKET STRUCTURE 51, 64 (Arnold Heertje & Mark Perlman eds.,
1990).
79 Dean Baker, The Housing Bubble and the Financial Crisis, 46 REAL WORLD ECON.
REV. 73, 74 (2008), http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue46/Baker46.pdf.
80 FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 39, at 8.
81 Baker, supra note 79, at 74–76.
82 Minsky, The Capital Development of the Economy and the Structure of Financial
Institutions, supra note 77, at 22–23.
83 Christoper Huhne, quoted on World Business Review (BBC World Service Sept. 1,
2007) (on file with author).
84 Id.

Do Not Delete

160

12/7/2011 2:19 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 15:1

Another problem is that rating agencies did not verify the
information provided by mortgage issuers.85 Instead, they based
their decisions on information received from intermediaries that,
as Minsky put it, “did not hazard any of their wealth on the
longer term viability of the underlying [loans].”86
Moreover, there are so many middlemen in the mortgage
securitization game, including a number that have been
permitted to operate in a largely unregulated manner, that no
one person or organization could be easily assigned blame in the
event of default. The chain between the borrower and the
investor includes realtors, home appraisers, mortgage brokers,
mortgage originators, investment banks that bundled the
mortgages, agencies that rated the bundles, and even companies
(like American International Group) that “insured” many of the
bundles.87
Mortgage-backed securities totaling into the trillions of
dollars were bundled and sold as shares to investors. In late
2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac alone held $4.1 trillion.88
Moreover, the private market in “credit-default swaps” (CDS)
reached $45 trillion by late 2007.89 The CDS were used by
borrowers and lenders as a hedge against (mortgage-backed)
securities losses, as a way to speculate that other companies will
experience a loss, or as an arbitrage instrument (that is, they
allowed purchasers to take advantage of price differences in the
market).90
Many of the mortgages underlying mortgage-backed
securities are now in foreclosure or headed there. In 2008, 2.3
million U.S. homes went into foreclosure, up 81% from 2007 and

85 OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, U.S. SEC, SUMMARY
REPORT OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE COMMISSION STAFF’S EXAMINATIONS OF SELECT
CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 17–18 (2008).
86 Minsky, The Capital Development of the Economy and the Structure of Financial
Institutions, supra note 77, at 23.
87 Mortgage brokers, who operated without much government regulation, accounted
for eighty percent of all U.S. mortgage originations in 2006, double their share a decade
earlier. See Der Hovanesian, supra note 69, at 72.
88 Scott Lanman & Dawn Kopecki, Fed Commits $800 Billion More to Unfreeze
Lending, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 25, 2008, 3:20 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?
pid=newsarchive&sid=ai_aErzotzx8.
89 Phillip A. O’Hara, The Global Securitized Subprime Market Crisis, 41 REV. OF
RADICAL POL. ECON. 318, 332 (2009).
90 Id. at 331–32.
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225% from 2006.91 There were an additional 2.8 million filings in
2009, and 2.9 million more in 2010.92
Mortgage delinquencies have also risen to record levels as a
result of the financial crisis and recession that followed. In
February 2009, for example, seven percent of U.S. homeowners
with mortgages were at least thirty days late on their loans, an
increase of more than fifty percent from a year earlier.93 Among
subprime borrowers, that month’s delinquency rate was 39.8%.94
According to the latest data available, the delinquency rate on
residential properties was just over nine percent of all loans
outstanding as of the end of the third quarter of 2010.95
There has been much public discussion in the United States
over the past few years about reckless homebuyers. Some were,
but mortgage seekers did not bring the economy to its knees on
their own. Trouble in the housing market would not have
generated a crisis of the magnitude we have witnessed in the
absence of the financial innovations described above.96 As
Minsky stressed at a pair of professional conferences in the late
1980s and early 1990s, there is a symbiotic relationship “between
the growth of securitization and managed money.”97
From a Minsky perspective, yet another part of the story of
the recent crisis is the role of hedge funds and other investment
funds—and of investment banks and other financial institutions.
Although the following discussion focuses on hedge funds (which
not only operated largely outside the realm of financial-system

91 Melinda Fulmer, Foreclosure’s Up 81% in 2008, MSN REAL ESTATE,
http://realestate.msn.com/article.aspx?cp-documentid=16831437 (last visited Mar. 21,
2011). The data is also available from various press releases provided by RealtyTrac in
2009, 2010, and 2011, available at http://www.realtytrac.com.
92 Press Release, RealtyTrac, Record 2.9 Million U.S. Properties Receive Foreclosure
Filings in 2010 Despite 30-Month Low in December (Jan. 12, 2011), available at
http://www.realtytrac.com/content/press-releases/record-29-million-us-properties-receiveforeclosure-filings-in-2010-despite-30-month-low-in-december-6309;
Press
Release,
RealtyTrac, Year-End Report Shows Record 2.8 Million U.S. Properties With Foreclosure
Filings in 2009 (Jan. 14, 2010), available at http://media.oregonlive.com/frontporch/
other/RealtyTrac%20Year-End%202009%20National%20Data%20FINAL.pdf.
93 Helen Chernikoff, U.S. Mortgage Delinquencies Up 50 Percent, REUTERS
UK (Apr. 8, 2009), available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2009/04/08/us-mortgagesdelinquencies-exclusive-idUKTRE5374LT20090408.
94 Id.
95 Press Release, Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, Delinquencies and Loans in Foreclosure
Decrease, But Foreclosure Starts Rise in Latest MBA National Delinquency Survey
(Nov. 18, 2010), available at http://www.mbaa.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/
74733.htm.
96 KEITH HENNESSEY ET AL., DISSENTING STATEMENT TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
INQUIRY COMMISSION REPORT: CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS 417–18
(2010), available at http://keithhennessey.com/2011/01/26/the-three-man-fcic-dissenthennessey-holtz-eakin-thomas/.
97 Minsky, Schumpeter: Finance and Evolution, supra note 78, at 71.
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regulation, but were relatively new to the scene prior to the
crisis), investment banks and other institutions played a similar
role.98
Some of the biggest purchasers of securitized mortgages
have been hedge funds. The earliest of these funds were
established in the first few decades after World War II for the
purpose of seeking absolute returns (rather than beating a
benchmark stock market index).99 They were indeed “hedged”
funds, which sought to protect principal from financial loss by
hedging investments through short selling (which involves
betting that the price of an investment product will fall) or other
means.100
The number of hedge funds and the assets under their
management expanded in the 1990s and grew even more rapidly
in the 2000s.101
At the same time, these assets became
increasingly concentrated at the top ten firms, and funds became
more diverse in terms of the strategies their managers
employed.102
In mid-2008, the Alternative Investment
Management Association estimated that the world’s hedge funds
(based primarily in the United States) were managing $2.5
trillion, though it acknowledged that other estimates were as
high as $4 trillion.103
The total value of assets under hedge-fund management is
uncertain because such funds are typically restricted to wealthy
individuals and institutional investors, which exempts them from
most financial-sector reporting requirements and regulation.104
Taking advantage of their largely unregulated status, managers
of hedge funds used mortgage-backed securities as collateral to
take out highly leveraged loans.105 They then purchased an
98 Indeed, since 1999, U.S. banking operated without the Glass Stegall firewall that
separated commercial and investment banking for over a half century. See Cyrus Sanati,
10 Years Later, Looking at Repeal of Glass-Steagall, DEALBOOK (Nov. 12, 2009, 3:49 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/11/12/10-years-later-looking-at-repeal-of-glass-steagall/.
99 James E. McWhinney, A Brief History of the Hedge Fund, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/mutualfund/05/HedgeFundHist.asp (last visited
Mar. 21, 2011).
100 See Definition of Hedge Fund, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/
h/hedgefund.asp (last visited Mar. 21, 2011).
101 IFSL
RESEARCH,
HEDGE
FUNDS
2009
(2009),
available
at
http://www.thehedgefundjournal.com/research/ifsl/cbs-hedge-funds-2009-2-.pdf;
CLARK
CHENG, SECURITIZATION & HEDGE FUNDS: CREATING A MORE EFFICIENT MARKET 3 fig. 1
(2002), available at www.securitization.net/pdf/rcg_hedge_080602.pdf.
102 See ALEXANDER INEICHEN & KURT SILBERSTEIN, ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT
SOLUTIONS, UBS GLOBAL ASSET MANAGEMENT, AIMA’S ROADMAP TO HEDGE FUNDS 17
(2008).
103 Id. at 16.
104 Investment Company Act of 1940, §§ 2–3, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2–80a-3 (2010).
105 James Freeman, How the Money Vanished: A Close Look at the Collapse of Bear
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assortment of financial instruments, including still more
mortgage bundles.106 As a result, the world’s hedge funds used
securitized mortgages to lay an inherently fragile foundation for
a financial “house of cards.”107
The recent crisis was unmistakably global. It had economic
and political ramifications on all continents. Its ripple effect
reached even unexpected places including rural China, which
saw workers return home from that nation’s export-oriented
cities when factories cut production.108
The global nature of the recent situation would not have
surprised Minsky, who stressed early on that money-manager
capitalism “is international in both the funds and the assets in
funds.”109 Looking ahead to the recent crisis, Minsky wrote: “The
problem of finance that will emerge is whether the . . .
institutions of national governments can contain both the
consequences of global financial fragility and an international
debt deflation.”110 He worried that the United States would be
unable to serve as “the guardian angel for stability in the world
economy” and stressed the need for “an international division of
responsibility for maintaining global aggregate gross profits.”111
In short, the global economy has recently experienced a
classic Minsky crisis—one with intertwined cyclical and
institutional (structural) dimensions. Its origins were in a
housing boom fueled by rising expectations, expanding debt, and
financial innovation. Then the bubble burst, creating first a
credit crunch, then a broader banking and stock-market crisis,
and, ultimately, a recession, the adverse effects of which continue
to linger, especially in labor, housing and financial markets.
Since 2007, the global banking industry has seen an
unprecedented shakeout, but even in early 2011 there is
uncertainty about how much more difficulty lies ahead. There
are concerns, for example, that some U.S. banks will be forced to
buy back mortgage securities that may have failed to meet
Stearns,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Mar.
6,
2009),
http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB123630340388147387.html.
106 Id.
107 Christopher Holt, A Graphical Look at Hedge Fund Leverage, SEEKING ALPHA
(Mar. 8, 2009), http://seekingalpha.com/article/124783-a-graphical-look-at-hedge-fundleverage.
108 Don Lee, Migrant Factory Workers at a Loss as China’s Economy Slumps, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 24, 2009, at C1.
109 Minsky, Schumpeter: Finance and Evolution, supra note 78, at 71.
110 Hyman P. Minsky, Longer Waves in Financial Relations, 29:1 J. ECON. ISSUES 83,
93 (1995).
111 Hyman P. Minsky, Global Consequences of Financial Deregulation, in 2 MARCUS
WALLENBERG PAPERS ON INT’L. FIN. 1, 15, 71 (1986).
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certain underwriting standards.112 The uncertainty regarding
institutional exposure to possible mortgage-related financial
losses was a contributor to the credit crunch of 2007, and similar
uncertainty exists today.113 In addition, a new threat has
emerged in the form of uncertainty about the fiscal stability of
entire nations, such as the recent concerns over Greece and
Ireland.114
III. THE ROLE OF PUBLIC POLICY
The third dimension in the political economy of Minsky is
the role of public policy. Before writing about Keynes and
studying with Schumpeter, Minsky was a student of Henry C.
Simons at the University of Chicago.115 Simons’ influence left an
indelible mark on Minsky’s approach to public policy.
Simons is remembered today as a critic of Keynes (as was
Schumpeter) and founder of the “Chicago School” brand of
economics that generally favors a laissez-faire approach to
economic policy.116 Nevertheless, his views were complex, and he
had a nuanced position on the role of government, one shaped by
a career that focused not only on that topic directly, but also on
taxation, monetary policy, and other specific aspects of economic
policy.117 Simons favored market decisions over collective action
in circumstances where competition prevailed, but he also gave
the public sector major responsibilities.118
These included
providing the legal foundation for such competition and acting
decisively—and, if need be, permanently—when such conditions
could not prevail.119
Simons’ notion that there is a “division of labor” between
what can be left to the market and what needs to be done by the
public sector manifests itself in Minsky’s overall conception of the
role of government, which can be seen perhaps most clearly in his
1986 book, Stabilizing an Unstable Economy.120
Simons’
112 David Indiviglio, Will Washington Let the Mortgage Put-back Fiasco Escalate?,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 2010, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/
2010/10/will-washington-let-the-mortgage-put-back-fiasco-escalate/64868/.
113 Id.
114 See RIKSBANK, FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 1/2010, 20 (2010), available at
http://www.riksbank.com/upload/Dokument_riksbank/Kat_publicerat/Rapporter/2010/
FSR1/FS_2010_1_eng_box1.pdf.
115 Minsky, in A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF DISSENTING ECONOMISTS, supra note
8, at 354.
116 Id.
117 See generally George J. Stigler, Henry Calvert Simons, 17 J. L. ECON. 1 (1974).
118 HENRY C. SIMONS, ECONOMIC POLICY FOR A FREE SOCIETY 99, 117 (1948).
119 Id. at 117; Minsky, in A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF DISSENTING ECONOMISTS,
supra note 8, at 354.
120 See MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY, supra note 6, at 332.
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influence also appears in Minsky’s attention to specific policy
elements, especially Minsky’s call for a “structure of industry
policy” aimed at preventing institutions from becoming “too big to
fail.”121 Against the backdrop of the recent financial crisis and
recession, Minsky’s approach to public policy can be presented as
generating an economic policy strategy aimed at recovery and
reform.
A. Recovery
The overall aim of Minsky’s strategy for economic recovery is
to prevent a recession from becoming another Great
Depression.122 That strategy gives attention to both fiscal policy
and monetary policy. Each is considered in turn.
The fiscal policy component of Minsky’s strategy centers on
what he called Big Government.123
At the heart of Big
Government is a federal budget that tends toward surpluses in
inflationary periods and produces deficits large enough to
stabilize aggregate profits in recessionary periods.124 Minsky
envisioned that such countercyclical spending would be a “builtin” feature of the budget structure, but he also recognized that
discretionary legislative action (the recent American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act, for example) would be needed on
occasion.125
The monetary policy component of Minsky’s strategy centers
on the stabilizing actions of the central bank. He envisioned that
the Federal Reserve (Fed) would intervene as “lender of last
resort” in response to the threat of a serious credit crisis and
economic contraction.126 “Central banks are the institutions that
are responsible for containing and offsetting financial
instability,” Minsky wrote in 1986.127 In that same year, he also
contributed an article emphasizing the globalization of finance
and calling for international central-bank coordination as a way
to prepare for the next big financial crisis.128
Much of what Minsky described in his recovery agenda has
been pursued by U.S. policymakers during the recent
121 For more on the compatibility of the views of Simons and Minsky with respect to
the role of the state, see Charles J. Whalen, Stabilizing the Unstable Economy: More on
the Minsky-Simons Connection, 25 J. ECON ISSUES 739 (1991).
122 See MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY, supra note 6, at 18–19.
123 See id.
124 See id. at 296–97, 302–04.
125 Id. at 132, 292.
126 Id. at 19.
127 Id. at 322.
128 See generally Minsky, Global Consequences of Financial Deregulation, supra note
111.
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recession.129 While fiscal policy already contained automatic
stabilizers, major legislative measures were taken to support
aggregate demand in 2008, 2009, and again in 2010.130 Monetary
policy has also been engaged in the stabilization effort.
To stabilize the financial sector and overall economy in the
wake of the recent financial crisis, the Fed aggressively cut
interest rates, allowed financial institutions to borrow from it at
nominal rates, and gave banks cash in exchange for risky assets
(promising to take on the risk that those assets could prove
worthless).131 The Fed, which students of Minsky sometimes call
the “Big Bank,” has also engineered bank mergers and worked
with other central banks to increase the supply of dollars
worldwide.132 In many ways, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke has
pursued a strategy consistent with Minsky’s conception of a Big
Bank that provides the monetary-policy complement to the fiscal
policy of Big Government.133
Legislation creating TARP in 2008 is also broadly consistent
with Minsky’s conception of the central bank as lender of last
resort.134 However, Minsky admired how the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation closed insolvent banks and assisted solvent
ones during the Great Depression.135 Thus, it is likely he would
have preferred a more hands-on approach to cleaning up bank
balance sheets than that resulting from TARP.
B. Reform
Looking beyond policies designed to address an economic
downturn, Minsky’s reform agenda included stricter regulation
and supervision of the financial system.136 It also included a
national commitment to full employment by means of publicservice employment for the jobless.137 The aim of both was to
foster and sustain a period of prosperity as well as lay the
foundation for more moderate future downturns.138

BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, supra note 42, at 34–35.
Id.
Id.
HYMAN P. MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY xvii (2d ed. 2008)
[hereinafter MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY (2d ed. 2008)].
133 For a discussion of the often overlooked link between Minsky’s ideas and financialmarket research organized by Bernanke at Princeton University, see Justin Lahart,
Bernanke’s Bubble Laboratory, WALL ST. J., May 16, 2008, at A1, A10.
134 On TARP, see BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, supra note 42, at 35.
135 MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY (2d ed. 2008), supra note 132, at xxi.
136 MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY, supra note 6, at 329–30.
137 Id. at 308–12.
138 Id.
129
130
131
132
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Minsky believed that those responsible for government
regulation and supervision of the financial system are in a
constant struggle with financial-market innovators.139 Any set of
regulations can contain financial innovation for only so long; then
an updated regulatory framework will be required—and the
process begins again. “After an initial interval, the basic
disequilibrating tendencies of capitalist finance will once again
push the financial structure to the brink of fragility,” he
explained.140
Still, Minsky believed it was necessary for the Fed and
regulators to continue the struggle: “The evolution of financial
practices must be guided to reduce the likelihood that fragile
situations conducive to financial instability will develop.”141 This
is where Dodd-Frank would fit into the Minsky framework.
Minsky’s financial reform also involved broader corporate
reform, which he sometimes called a structure-of-industry
policy.142 This included placing size limits on corporations based
on the level of assets and/or employment.143 These were seen as
a way to foster greater competition, reduce the need for lender-oflast-resort interventions, and avoid situations in which specific
corporations would be seen as “too big to fail.”144
Minsky’s reform agenda also included an employment policy
that envisions government as “employer of last resort.”145 The
idea was for public-service employment based roughly on the
New Deal Era’s Works Progress Administration and Civilian
Conservation Corps.146 This policy would provide able-bodied
people with an alternative to joblessness and unemployment
benefits; under such a policy, public-service payrolls would rise
and fall to offset private-sector demand for workers.147 In
Minsky’s view, the policy would help stabilize the economy, but it
would also help foster a more humane economy.148
CONCLUSION: STANDING ON THE SHOULDERS OF MINSKY
With enactment of Dodd-Frank, financial regulation has
entered a new era. The political economy of Minsky can

139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148

Id. at 252.
Id. at 333.
Id. at 322.
MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY, supra note 6, at 330–31.
Id. at 330.
Id. at 330–31.
Id. at xvii, 308–312.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 293.
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accompany that era with a fresh approach to economics. In place
of the efficient-market hypothesis, Minsky offers a financialinstability alternative.
That alternative is consistent with
Keynes’ observation that business cycles are a characteristic
feature of advanced capitalist economies.149 Minsky’s approach
also incorporates Schumpeter’s recognition of incessant
institutional innovation;150 indeed, recent innovations help
explain the first serious financial crisis of the age of moneymanager capitalism. In addition, Minsky’s approach earns the
name “political” economy because, drawing inspiration from
Simons, he envisioned an important division of labor between the
market and the public sector, one that gives key responsibilities
to government in the realm of economic management.151
Minsky used to say we should stand on the shoulders of
giants to better understand the economy.152 Just as he stood on
the shoulders of Keynes, Schumpeter, and Simons, we can now
stand on his shoulders—to not only better understand the recent
financial crisis, the Great Recession, and the anemic U.S.
recovery, but also to better anticipate what might lie ahead.
From a Minsky perspective, explaining current events involves
incorporating cyclical and structural dimensions.153
His
perspective also involves devising a policy strategy that gives
attention to both recovery and reform.154
The recent attention to Minsky’s ideas, in the academy and
in the practical world of financial decision-making, has enriched
our understanding. But Minsky has been “discovered” in the
midst of other periods of financial turmoil (in October 1987, for
example), only to fall back into obscurity once the economy has
recovered. We do ourselves a disservice when Minsky’s insights
are reduced to an analysis of just a single event (a “Minsky
moment”) or even of financial instability.
Here is how that can be avoided. Standing squarely on the
shoulders of Minsky means recognizing the perennial value of
evolutionary and institutionally focused thinking about the
economy. It also means giving serious attention not only to
business cycles and financial innovation but also to Minsky’s

MINSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, supra note 9, at 56–57.
Minsky, in A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF DISSENTING ECONOMISTS, supra note
8, at 354–55.
151 Id.
152 MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY (2d ed. 2008), supra note 132, at
xiii.
153 Id. at vii–viii.
154 See, e.g., MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY, supra note 6, at 290.
149
150
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effort to guide the further development of the economic system in
a more humane direction.155

155 For more on the path forward for economics, using analyses inspired by Minsky,
see FINANCIAL INSTABILITY AND ECONOMIC SECURITY AFTER THE GREAT RECESSION
(Charles J. Whalen ed.) (forthcoming 2011).

